Lehman, Bear Stearns Execs Cashed In As Their Firms Failed: Study

Lehman, Bear Stearns Execs Cashed In As Their Firms Failed: Study

If you thought that the executives at Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns paid dearly in when their firms famously imploded last year, think again.

A new study by three professors at the Program for Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School reexamines the "standard narrative" of the loss of wealth suffered by top leaders at Bear and Lehman. The top five executives at Bear and Lehman were able to sell billions in stock holdings from 200-2008, the study notes, while most shareholders saw their investments in the two firms decimated.

During the same period, the study notes, "the shareholder payoffs these teams produced were indisputably poor." From the study:

Overall, we estimate that the top executive teams of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers derived cash flows of about $1.4 billion and $1 billion respectively from cash bonuses and equity sales during 2000-2008. These cash flows substantially exceeded the value of the executives' initial holdings in the beginning of the period, and the executives' net payoffs for the period were thus decidedly positive. The divergence between how the top executives and their shareholders fared implies that it is not possible to rule out, as standard narratives suggest, that the executives' pay arrangements provided them with excessive risk-taking incentives.

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The study arrives a conclusion long-held by critics of the financial industry. In short, Wall Street pay was specifically structured to encourage short-term gains:

"...the executives were the able to obtain large amounts of bonus compensation based on high earnings in the years preceding the financial crisis, but did not have to return any of those bonuses when the earnings subsequently evaporated and turned into massive losses. Such a design of bonus compensation provides executives with incentives to seek improvements in short-term earnings figures even at the cost of maintaining an excessively high risk of large losses down the road."

Interestingly, the study suggests that Wall Street's bonus culture may not be the largest cause of the excessive risks taken by the industry. Fixing compensation isn't merely an issue of increasing stock awards and limiting bonuses; in fact, the study steers clear of suggestions that pay should be capped. Instead, the study argues that the failure of Bear and Lehman suggest that compensation clawbacks should be considered.

READ the report here: ...

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